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SILKWOOD V KERR-McGEE CORP.:
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND FEDERAL
PREEMPTION RESCUE THE NUCLEAR
TORTFEASOR
INTRODUCTION
One of the most widely publicized and controversial cases in recent his-
tory, S//kwood v. Kerr-McGe Corp. ,I came before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1981.2 Karen Silkwood, a Kerr-McGee employee, had suffered
from plutonium contamination. 3 An action brought by her estate in the
District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma resulted in a significant
award for compensatory and punitive damages.
4
The lower court ruling was reversed on appeal. In a split decision, the
Tenth Circuit court determined Silkwood's exposure to plutonium was job-
related, and compensatory damages for personal injuries were therefore lim-
ited to amounts recoverable under Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation
Act. 5 The appellate court also ruled punitive, damages could not be
awarded because such an award constituted an intrusion into the federally
controlled nuclear regulatory scheme.6
This comment will focus on two issues: applicability of workers' com-
pensation law and the extent of federal occupation in nuclear incident dis-
putes. A review of the factual and legal background of the case, an
examination of the Tenth Circuit court's reasoning, and a discussion of legal
and social implications of the decision will follow.
I. 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
2. This was the second time the parties had been before the Tenth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The original petition had alleged a conspiracy by Kerr-McGee to prevent Silkwood and
others from organizing a labor union and asserted first amendment, due process, and equal
protection violations by Kerr-McGee. The Tenth Circuit court affirmed the trial court's dismis-
sal of these claims in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 833 (1981).
3. 667 F.2d at 913.
4. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), rev'd, 667 F.2d
908 (10th Cir. 1981),cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983). Thejury awarded $500,000 for personal
injuries, $5,000 for property damages, and $10 million in punitive damages. For a discussion of
the district court decision, see Note, Federal Preemption.- State Law Principles of Strita Liabihy in a
Nuclear Accident-A Preemption Problem in Light of the Price-Anderson Act.'-Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee
Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566 (W.D. Okla. 1979), 6 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279 (1981).
5. 667 F.2d at 920. The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act is found at OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 85, §§ 1-180 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
6. 667 F.2d at 923. In addition to the workers' compensation and preemption issues,
Kerr-McGee argued the verdict was excessive and contrary to the weight of the evidence, the
trial court had erred in rulings and instructions on strict liability and negligence, and it was
denied a fair trial because of prejudicial publicity, misconduct of opposing counsel, and errors
in the court's rulings on evidence and instructions to the jury. Brief of Appellants at 20-30,
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 103 S. Ct. 721
(1983).
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I. THE FACTUAL SETTING AND THE DISTRICT COURT'S OPINION
Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation 7 operated a nuclear fuels processing
plant in Cimmaron, Oklahoma where plutonium was processed for reactor
fuel.8 Karen Silkwood, a laboratory analyst at the Cimmaron plant, be-
longed to the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW) and was a
member of the union negotiating team. 9 In September of 1974, Silkwood
and other union members presented charges to the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion (AEC), ° alleging health and safety violations by Kerr-McGee. The
task of gathering required documentation of the charges was assigned to
Silkwood. ' I
On November 5, 6, and 7, 1974, Silkwood was contaminated by pluto-
nium,t 2 but little direct evidence of the contaminations was produced. The
inferences drawn from the circumstantial evidence, however, were pivotal to
the conclusions of both the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals with respect to whether Silkwood's injuries arose out of her
employment.
While at work on November 5, Silkwood monitored herself with pluto-
nium detecting devices before and after a break, but found no contamina-
tion.t 3 Shortly thereafter, she began working in two glove boxes14 which
contained plutonium, and about three hours later she detected contamina-
tion. 15 Further checks of the laboratory revealed contamination inside the
gloves and in the glove boxes where Silkwood had been working. Silkwood's
left hand, right wrist, upper arm, neck, face, hair, and nostrils registered
contamination. 6 She was immediately decontaminated and required to
submit five days' urine and fecal samples which were to be sent to the
7. Suit was brought against both Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. and its parent, Kerr-McGee
Corp. The jury found Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp. to be a mere instrumentality of the parent
corporation, thus making Kerr-McGee Corp. liable. See Silkwood, 485 F. Supp. at 601 app.
8. Plutonium is a man-made radioactive element used in nuclear weapons and fuels. It
emits alpha particles which, although dependent on the size and amount of energy in the radia-
tion, constitute the major hazard associated with plutonium. Damage may occur when alpha
particles strike living cells; however, the particles cannot penetrate human skin, and small quan-
tities of plutonium on skin or clothing are not dangerous. It is the internal deposition of pluto-
nium which might occur, for example, by inhalation that makes plutonium one of the most
carcinogenic substances known. When internally deposited, alpha particles can damage bone
and internal organs. Brief of Appellants at 5-6, Silkwood. See Note, Nuclear Torts. The Price-
Anderson Act and the Potentialfor Uncompensated Injug, 11 NEW ENG. L. REV. 11I, 113 (1975).
9. Silkwood was elected to this position and was responsible for health and safety matters.
Brief of Appellee at 8, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), cert.
granted, 103 S. Ct. 721 (1983).
10. The AEC is now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but it will be referred to
throughout this comment as the AEC.
11. Silkwood's investigative role spawned media speculation after her death on whether
the contamination was intentionally inflicted by Kerr-McGee. Plaintiff contended at trial that
Silkwood's evidence-gathering activities provided a motive for an intentional contamination by
Kerr-McGee operatives. See Brief of Appellee at 42 n.21, Silkwood.
12. 667 F.2d at 913.
13. Id
14. "A glove box is an impervious box surrounding the plutonium and processing equip-
ment; it has glove holes so a worker can operate the equipment or manipulate the material from
outside the box." Brief of Appellants at 7, Silkwood.
15. 667 F.2d at 913.
16. Id.
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United States Testing Laboratory for analysis.' 7  Later AEC tests did not
find any leaks inside the glove boxes, nor any significant airborne contami-
nation in the laboratory.'
8
On November 6, Silkwood did not work with plutonium, but did
paperwork for a short time before she left for a union meeting. 19 Upon
leaving, she detected contamination on her hands and fixed contamination
on her right forearm. 20 Her hands were decontaminated, and since the fore-
arm contamination was fixed, she was permitted to attend the meeting.
2 '
Later that day, a survey showed external contamination on her right fore-
arm, neck, and face which was not fixed, 22 and a nasal smear also indicated
contamination. 23 At her request, Silkwood's car and locker were tested, but
no contamination was found.
24
When Silkwood reported to the health-physics office on the morning of
November 7, contamination was again found on various parts of her body,25
and the nasal smear taken that morning was again positive. 26 The urine and
fecal samples that Silkwood brought were also contaminated, however, the
urine samples had been "spiked," i.e., they contained plutonium which was
not naturally excreted. 27 Plutonium contamination was also found in
Silkwood's apartment, making it necessary for Kerr-McGee to decontami-
nate the apartment and dispose of many of Silkwood's possessions. 28 The
highest concentrations of plutonium were found in the bathroom and on a
bologna package in the refrigerator.
29
Very little direct evidence was presented at trial to support inferences of
the location or method of Silkwood's contamination. Certain hearsay evi-
dence was admitted which purportedly indicated her state of mind, which
was relevant to the issue of whether she had intentionally removed pluto-
nium from the plant.30 Silkwood was reported to have stated that she spilled
her urine sample in her bathroom early in the morning on November 7 and
that at the time, a package of bologna was on top of the toilet where she had
placed it before preparing her lunch.
3 '
17. Id
18. Id. at 913-14.
19. Id at 914.
20. Id Contamination that is "fixed" is not eliminated by scrubbing with soap and water.
Brief of Appellee at 11, Silkwood.
21. 667 F.2d at 914.
22. Id
23. Brief of Appellee at 12, Silkwood.
24. 667 F.2d at 914.
25. d
26. Brief of Appellee at 13, Silkwood.
27. 667 F.2d at 914.
28. Id
29. Id
30. Id See infta note 41.
31. 667 F.2d at 914. Silkwood's roommate was also a Kerr-McGee employee. Contamina-
tion was found on her hands and buttocks after she had used the bathroom at home, but no
contamination was detected on her body at work, in her automobile, or in the refrigerator
where she kept her lunch at the plant. Id
Contamination was not found on Silkwood's boyfriend who had spent the night of Novem-
ber 6 in her apartment, nor was contamination found in his car or residence. Id
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Three days later, Silkwood was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific Labo-
ratory in New Mexico where she underwent whole body and chest count
procedures. 32 She returned to work on November 13 and was assigned to a
job not involving plutonium. 33 On that day, she met with AEC inspectors
concerning her contamination and later with other union members in a
strategy session.3' 4 That evening while on her way to meet with a New York
Tines reporter and an OCAW leader regarding the information she had
been gathering, Silkwood was killed in an automobile accident. 35 At the
time of her death, Silkwood's body contailned twenty-five to fifty percent of
the AEC allowable lifetime body burden for plutonium workers.
36
Both Kerr-McGee and the AEC investigated Silkwood's contaminations
of November 5 and 6, but neither identified the exact manner by which she
became contaminated. 37 Evidence surrounding the apartment contamina-
tion of November 7 indicated that it probably occurred in the bathroom,
3 8
but how Silkwood's urine sample kits became spiked is not known.
Over the course of the eleven-week trial, the jury was presented with
conflicting theories regarding the nature and extent of Silkwood's injuries,
and the inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence surrounding
the contaminations.3 9 Kerr-McGee claimed that Silkwood had intentionally
removed plutonium from the plant, 40 but alternatively argued that the con-
taminations were work-related, and thus subject to Oklahoma's workers'
compensation law and the exclusive jurisdiction of the industrial court.
4 1
32. Brief of Appellee at 16-17, Silkwood.
33. Id. at 17.
34. Evidence was introduced at trial that at the union meeting, Silkwood had shown an-
other OCAW member "a special notebook and brown manila folder and said she had proof of
falsification of records and samples of bad fuel welds which had been shipped." Brief of Appel-
lee at 18, Silkwood (citations to transcripts omitted). These documents, however, were never
recovered. Id
35. Silkwood died as a result of injuries she sustained when her car ran off the road and hit
a culvert. Brief of Appellants at 16, Silkwood.
36. Expert testimony concerning the level of Silkwood's plutonium contamination was dis-
crepant. Kerr-McGee and AEC consultants who investigated the contaminations estimated the
level to be near the low end of the allowable range, while Silkwood's experts cited reasons and
data suggesting that the actual levels were higher. Brief of Appellee at 75 n.44, Silkwood.
The "allowable lifetime body burden" does not represent a tolerance level below which
injury never occurs; instead, it is a risk-balancing effort between industrial participation and the
level which would probably produce harmful affects. See L. Taylor, Radiation Exposure as a Reason-
able Calculated Risk, reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Research and Development of the Joint
Comm. on Atomic Energy on Employee Radiation Hazards and Workmens' Compensation, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1959); Hallmark, Radation Protection Standards and the Administrative Decisionmaking Process,
8 ENVTL. L. 785 (1978).
37. Brief of Appellant at 8 n. 1, Silkwood.
38. 667 F.2d at 914.
39. Kerr-McGee contended that physical injury would not result if contamination levels
were below those established by the AEC as the allowable burden. Further, it contended that
damages could not be awarded for mental anguish absent evidence of a substantial physical
injury. Brief of Appellants at 73-76, Silkwood. Plaintiff contended that Silkwood had sustained
physical injuries, even if only at the cellular level, and mental anguish resulted from Silkwood's
knowledge of such injuries. Id. at 75-79.
40. The argument was that Silkwood had removed plutonium in an effort to discredit and
embarrass Kerr-McGee. Id. at 72.
41. A finding that Silkwood had intentionally removed plutonium would have absolved
Kerr-McGee from common law and workers' compensation liability. 667 F.2d at 919.
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The jury found that Silkwood had not intentionally removed plutonium
from the plant,4 2 although a formal instruction on whether the injuries were
sustained in the course of employment was not submitted for jury considera-
tion.4 3 The district court did instruct the jury that if it found that Silkwood
had not intentionally removed plutonium, Kerr-McGee's participation in an
ultrahazardous activity made it strictly liable for any injuries or damage
which the activity caused. 4 4 The jury returned a verdict for compensatory
damages totaling $505,000, of which $500,000 was awarded for Silkwood's
personal injuries and $5,000 for the damage to her property from the No-
vember 7 contamination.
The district court also allowed the jury to determine whether Kerr-Mc-
Gee had behaved in an intentional or reckless manner toward Silkwood,
thereby making possible a verdict for punitive damages. 45 Kerr-McGee ar-
gued that since it had not violated any AEC regulation, it could not have
behaved recklessly.46 Nevertheless, the court instructed the jury that sub-
stantial compliance with regulations, although probative, was not necessarily
conclusive on the issue of due care.47 The jury returned an unprecedented
$10,000,000 punitive damages verdict and the district court entered judg-




At common law, an employee was required to prove negligence on the
part of his employer in order to recover damages for personal injuries suf-
fered on the job.49 Even if he were able to show negligence, the employee
might be faced with the employer's defenses of assumption of risk, contribu-
tory negligence, and the fellow-servant rule.5 ° Consequently, recovery by
injured employees was rare, often inadequate, and only available after pro-
longed and costly litigation.
5 1
42. 485 F. Supp. at 576.
43. It was the Court's determination that a formal workmen's compensation issue
could not be presented to the jury without an involved dissertation on the nature and
purpose of compensation laws, their difference from traditional common law tort
claims, and the real possibility such an instruction would confuse the jury and thwart
the process of justice. Actual submission was made to the jury by submission of the
specific factual issue of whether Silkwood intentionally took plutonium to her apart-
ment. . . . The evidence that Silkwood might have accidentally taken the plutonium
home on her person or clothing was weak, speculative, and contradicted by virtually
all defendants' own evidence. The Court could not properly submit a question with
no evidentiary foundation to the jury. Nothing more was required to avoid the de-
fense that compensation laws barred the instant claim.
Id. at 588.
44. Id at 597 app.
45. Id at 603 app.
46. Id at 587.
47. Id at 606-07 app.
48. Id. at 589-91.
49. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1179 (6th




The dismal failure of the common law to protect the injured worker
prompted legislatures throughout the United States to enact workers' com-
pensation laws.5 2 Based on the theory that the cost of the employer's prod-
uct should reflect the financial risk of employee injuries, 53 the hallmark of all
workers' compensation laws is employer liability for work-related injury, re-
gardless of fault. 54 The compromise achieved by workers' compensation
statutes is that the employee is relieved of the burden of proving negligence
and assured of compensation, while the employer is protected against unlim-
ited common law liability by the statutorily prescribed compensation
limits. 55
Oklahoma's Workers' Compensation Act (Act) is typical of the legisla-
tion enacted in most states. 56 It requires an employer to pay compensation
according to the schedules provided by statute for an employee's work-re-
lated disability or death, regardless of fault. 5 7 Exclusive employer liability is
established under the Act, thereby barring any common law action for per-
sonal injury.5 8 Even where statutory compensation in a particular case is
grossly inadequate, the employee may not bring a common law suit for re-
covery of damages in excess of the compensation limits. 59
The Oklahoma Workers' Compensation Act includes a provision which
creates a rebuttable presumption that an injured employee is covered by the
Act.60 In construing this provision, the Oklahoma Supreme Court estab-
lished that an injured employee can meet his burden of proof to show that
the injury was work-related by presenting circumstantial evidence.
6 t
In Silkwood, the question of whether this presumption of coverage by the
Act may also be used to the advantage of the employer was presented.
62
Kerr-McGee argued that in asserting workers' compensation as a defense to
the plaintiff's common law claim, it was entitled to the presumption of cov-
erage by the Act.
63
B. Federal Preempizon
The doctrine of preemption is based on the supremacy clause of the
52. Riesenfeld, Forty Years of American Workmen's Compensation, 35 MINN. L. REv. 525, 527
(1951).
53. See TORTS, supra note 49, at 1180.
54. See I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1972).
55. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 531 (4th ed. 1971).
56. See A. LARSON, supra note 54, at § 1.10.
57. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § II (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
58. Id. § 12.
59. See, e.g., Smith v. Baker, 157 Okla. 155, 11 P.2d 132 (1932). See also 2A A. LARSON,
THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 65.20 (1972); W. PROSSER, supra note 55, at 531-
32.
60. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 27 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
61. In re May, 586 P.2d 738, 740-41 (Okla. 1978). Seegeneralo Wilcox Oil Co. v. Fuqua,
203 Okla. 391, 224 P.2d 255 (1950) (holding that even an unexplained or unwitnessed injury is
compensable under the statute if there is a "strong possibility" that the injury is work-related).
62. Related issues were addressed in Harter Concrete Prod., Inc. v. Harris, 592 P.2d 526,
528 (Okla. 1979) (noting reciprocity of not requiring employee to prove negligence and limiting
liability of employer) and Fox v. Dunning, 124 Okla. 228, 255 P. 582 (1927) (stating that the
Act was reciprocal in eliminating common law right).
63. Brief of Appellants at 38-41, Silkwood.
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United States Constitution.6 4 Under the doctrine, in order to effectuate to-
tal congressional control over a particular field, state regulation that conflicts
with federal legislation is rendered void. 65 Federal intent to occupy a field is
strictly scrutinized. 66 Federal supremacy is upheld where Congress has ex-
plicitly prohibited state regulation or where intent to preempt can be in-
ferred from either the nature or subject matter of the federal regulatory
scheme. State interests are otherwise protected by a presumption of validity
of state law.
6 7
Tort remedies represent a field historically left to state authority; there-
fore, congressional intent to preempt state tort law is not readily inferred.
6 8
Prior to the enactment of federal legislation governing nuclear accidents, all
questions of tort liability for radiation injuries were determined according to
the common law of the state. In 1957, Congress adopted the Price-Anderson
Act (Act),69 a response to the finding of the Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy that "the problem of possible liability in connection with the opera-
tion of reactors [was] a major deterrent to further industrial participation in
the [development of nuclear power]."
'70
One of the purposes of the Act was to assure that compensation would
be made to claimants injured in a "nuclear incident."' 7 1 The Act required
all licensees of the AEC to purchase the maximum amount of privately
available insurance. It also established a governmental indemnity fund to
provide compensation in the event that claims exceeded the amount of the
private insurance maximum liability. 72 Federal interference, according to
64. The supremacy clause states that "[tihe Laws of the United States . . .shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2.
65. See generally H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 435 (1953); Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489
(1954).
A determination of preemption is not a matter governed by clear-cut rules. "The fact that
Congress has spoken in an area of state regulation does not necessarily preclude all state regula-
tion; and the fact that there is no explicit federal-state conflict or no explicit congressional state-
ment of intent to bar state authority does not bar a finding of preemption." G. GUNTHER,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 344 (10th ed. 1980).
66. Note, The Preemption Doctrine: Shi?zg Perspectves on Federalism and the Burger Court, 75
COLUM. L. REV. 623, 624 (1975).
67. "[T]he presumption operates in favor of the validity of the state law; courts are not to
seek out conflicts between state and federal regulation where none clearly exist." Pacific Legal
Found. v. State Energy Resources Comm'n, 659 F.2d 903, 919 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S.
Ct. 2959 (1982).
68. C. ANTIEAU, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 50 (1969).
69. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
70. S. REP. No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprthed in 1957 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1803.
71. A "nuclear incident" is defined as:
[a]ny occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United
States causing . . .bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to
property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive,
toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct
material.
42 U.S.C. § 2 014(q) (1976). "Extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined inhfa at note 74.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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the Senate Report, would be limited to situations where claims exceeded
private insurance coverage. Payments would then be prorated at the federal
level with proceeds available in the indemnity fund rather than issued
through state courts. 73 The original Price-Anderson Act apparently contem-
plated that the liability standard (i.e., negligence or strict liability) for all
nuclear incidents was to be determined by the individual state.
The Act was amended in 1966 to provide for the imposition of strict
liability in cases involving an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" (ENO).
7 4
In the event of an ENO, Congress explicitly stated that a strict liability stan-
dard should apply, thus relieving ENO victims of the burden of proving
negligence in those states adhering to a negligence standard.
75 In those cata-
strophic situations, recovery may be limited to compensatory damages.
76
The 1966 amendment left intact the authority of the individual states to
set liability standards for nuclear incidents below the ENO level. 7 7 How-
ever, it is not specified in the Price-Anderson Act, nor is it apparent in its
legislative history, that recovery in suits involving incidents below the ENO
level is limited to compensatory damages. A congressional intention for state
statutory and common law decision-making may thus be inferred except in
catastrophic cases where liability would exceed the amount of available pri-
vate insurance funds.
Both the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals have dealt with
the preemption issue in the context of express state regulation of nuclear
facilities. 78 In those cases, specific state provisions regulating nuclear power
plants were challenged as being in conflict with federal regulations. In North-
73. [T]here is no interference with State law until there is a likelihood that the dam-
ages exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount
of the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition
of making payments through that state's courts and to prorating the proceeds
available.
S. REP. No. 296, supra note 70 at 1810.
74. Act of Oct. 13, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-645, 80 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 20140) (1976)).
The term "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" means any event causing a discharge or
dispersal of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material from its intended place of
confinement in amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the [AEC]
determines to be substantial, and which . . . will probably result in substantial dam-
ages to persons offsite or property offsite.
42 U.S.C. § 22100) (1976).
75. "The question whether courts should apply legal principles akin to those of strict liabil-
ity in the event of a serious nuclear incident seems to the committee to be free from dispute." S.
REP. No. 1605, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3209.
76. During the 1965 hearings, the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy recommended that,
at the point where public liability exceeds the limit of liability, the federal judiciary prorate the
proceeds available. Presumably, this would limit recovery to compensatory damages. See id at
3216-17.
77. See S. REP. No. 1605, supra note 75, at 3201. See generaly Keyes & Howarth, Approaches
to Liability for Remote Causes. The Low-Level Radiation Example, 56 IowA L. REV. 531 (1971); Note,
The "Extraordinay Nuclear Occurrence" Threshold and Uncompensated Injury Under the Price-Anderson
Act, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. REV. 360 (1974); Comment, The Irradiated Plaintff Tort Recovery Outside
Price-Andrson, 6 ENVTL. L. REV. 859 (1976).
78. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 659
F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982); Northern States Power Co. v.
Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af'dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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ern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,79 the Eighth Circuit held that a Minnesota
statute which intended to regulate levels of radioactive effluents was pre-
empted by a federal statute. The AEC was found to have exclusive author-
ity to regulate construction and operation of nuclear power plants including
authority to impose standards for radioactive discharge.80
In Pacifw Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Develop-
ment Commiss'on,8 ' a more recent decision, the Ninth Circuit noted that al-
though a state law must be held invalid to the extent that it actually conflicts
with federal law, the presumption operates in favor of the validity of state
law.8 2 Neither of the two California statutes at issue regulated an area ex-
plicitly reserved to the AEC, and neither impeded congressional goals; there-
fore, those state laws were not preempted.
8 3
The Tenth Circuit was faced with a different question of preemption in
Si'lkwood. State tort law rather than specific legislation was the arena of the
asserted conflict. There was no statutory provision which conflicted with
federal nuclear regulations, but the court found the common law interfered.
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
A. The Presumption of Coverage by Workers' Compensation Is Reciprocal
The Tenth Circuit majority in SiZkwood adopted what the district court
stated "would constitute a new horizon in the traditional field of tort litiga-
tion,"84 i.e., that an employer asserting workers' compensation as a defense
to an employee's common law action is entitled to the protection of the pre-
sumption that the employee's injury occurred on the job.85 Traditionally,
the presumption ofjob-relatedness has been asserted by the employee so that
he would be assured of at least a limited compensation for personal injuries
without the requisite proof of employer fault. 8 6 The Tenth Circuit ruling
allows an employer to assert the presumption defensively to limit its poten-
tial liability. To recover more than the limited compensation under the Act,
an employee must rebut the presumption with sufficient evidence that the
injuries were not sustained on the job.8 7 Writing for the majority, Judge
Logan reasoned that the purpose of a liberal construction which supports
jurisdiction of the industrial court is both to ensure the injured employee's
protection under the Act and to protect the employer from excessive
judgments.
8 8
Citing Oklahoma Steel Casting Co. v. Banks,8 9 the court acknowledged that
79. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 197 1), afdmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
80. 447 F.2d at 1154.
81. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
82. 659 F.2d at 919.
83. Id. at 928.
84. 485 F. Supp. at 588.
85. 667 F.2d at 917.
86. See, e.g., In re May, 586 P.2d 738, 740 (Okla. 1978); City of Nichols Hills v. Hill, 534
P.2d 931, 934 (Okla. 1975). See A. LARSON, supra note 54 and accompanying text.
87. See Silkwood, 667 F.2d at 918-19.
88. Id at 916.
89. 181 Okla. 503, 74 P.2d 1168 (1937).
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workers' compensation is an affirmative defense which the employer has the
burden of proving.90 The majority determined, however, that the method
for proving that an injury arose out of employment would be the same
whether offered by an employee or employer.9 1 Therefore, circumstantial
evidence which supports a reasonable inference of coverage is sufficient to
sustain the burden of an employee attempting to prove a claim or an em-
ployer seeking to bar an action at common law.
92
Admitting that the circumstantial evidence as to the time, place, and
manner of Silkwood's contaminations was "thin at best," 93 Judge Logan em-
phasized that a finding other than that the exposures were job-related was
not supported by the evidence. The majority inferred that the contamina-
tions occurred within the course of employment and found the plaintiff had
not produced substantial evidence to rebut that inference. 94 Kerr-McGee
thus established a prima facie case that the injury was within the protection
of the workers' compensation law. 95 The Tenth Circuit therefore reversed
the $500,000 personal injury judgment and remanded the case for determi-
nation under the Workers' Compensation Act.
B. Strict Liabihty for Property Damages
Because the Oklahoma workers' compensation statute applies only to
personal injuries, the issue of compensation for the destruction of Silkwood's
contaminated property was given separate consideration. 96 The court con-
sidered whether the federal regulatory scheme for the nuclear industry pre-
empted the application of state tort law for Silkwood's property damage.
97
The court determined that, in this case, the imposition of the state standard
of strict liability for the property damage would not constitute a significant
interference with federal control of the Kerr-McGee plant.98 Noting that
provisions in the Price-Anderson Act for victim compensation only apply to
extraordinary nuclear occurrences, the court concluded that liability for nu-
clear incidents below the ENO level is to be determined by state tort law. 99
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit court found that Oklahoma's law of
strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities was applicable to off-site
plutonium contamination. 100 Thus, the court affirmed the $5,000 judgment
for Silkwood's property damage.
90. 667 F.2d at 917.
91. Id
92. Id
93. 1d. at 918.
94. Id at 918-19.
95. Id at 919.
96. Id at 920; see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § I1 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
97. 667 F.2d at 920.
98. Id.
99. Id at 921.
100. Id (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 comment (e) (1977) (strict liabil-
ity applies to "harm that is within the scope of the abnormal risk that is the basis of the
liability")).
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C. Punitive Damages Prohibited
The court acknowledged that the Price-Anderson Act and its legislative
history are silent as to the types of damages a state may impose for injuries
below the ENO level.' 0 ' The court reasoned, however, that the deterrent or
regulatory effect of punitive damages would compete substantially with fed-
eral control over the nuclear industry. 10 2 Judge Logan acknowledged that
where a state's laws affect interests as vital to its citizens as those in Sl7kwood,
a strong presumption against preemption would seem to be warranted.
10 3
Nevertheless, the court found that federal law preempted the imposition of
punitive damages because the nuclear industry was initially developed by
the federal government, is closely linked with national security, and is exten-
sively regulated by a federal agency.' 0 g A judicial award of punitive dam-
ages, Judge Logan concluded, is no less intrusive to the federal scheme than
direct legislative acts of the state. 105
The Tenth Circuit consequently reversed the $10,000,000 punitive
damages judgment. Judge Logan emphasized that a violation of AEC regu-
lations by Kerr-McGee would not have resulted in a different decision: fed-
eral preemption prohibits punitive damage awards regardless of a finding of
an actual violation of AEC regulations.' 0 6 The court reasoned that the
power of the AEC to license, investigate, enjoin, and seek civil and criminal
sanctions where it regards practices as improper, precluds judicial imposi-
tion of punishment.'
0 7
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. Apphlcabth'ty of Workers' Compensation Law
1. The Reciprocal Presumption
The majority determined that since a statutory presumption operates in
favor of workers' compensation coverage when an employee makes a claim
for workers' compensation, a reciprocal presumption operates in favor of the
employer asserting workers' compensation coverage as a defense to an em-
ployee's common law suit.' 08 This reciprocal presumption thus requires an
employee bringing a common law claim to rebut by "substantial evidence"
the existence of his employer's affirmative defense of compensation cover-
age.' 0 9 A question which the court failed to answer, however, is what consti-
101. Id. at 922.
102. The court noted that "punitive damages are 'awarded against a person to punish him
for his outrageous conduct and to deter him and others like him from similar conduct in the
future.'" Id (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(l) (1979)). See also W. PROS-
SER, supra note 55, at 9.
103. 667 F.2d at 923.
104. Id. See Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aJfd
mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972); see also Note, A Framework for Preemptiwn Analysis, 88 YALE L.J. 363,
379-81 (1978).
105. 667 F.2d at 923.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 917.
109. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 85, § 27 (West 1970 & Supp. 1981-82).
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tutes "substantial evidence." Interpreted from a traditional perspective, this
requirement means evidence from which reasonable men could infer that the
injury was not job-related. Arguably, the plaintiff in Silkwood did produce
such circumstantial evidence.1 10 Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit concluded
that the plaintiff had failed to rebut the defense of compensation cover-
age.tII This conclusion suggests that an employee must produce direct evi-
dence to rebut the presumption of job-relatedness.
2. Existence of a Jury Question
The court's analysis results in legal symmetry in that the presumption of
compensation coverage is available to both the employer and the employee.
However, where inferences to be drawn from facts may lead to reasonable
differences of opinion, the issue of the applicability of workers' compensation
is a jury question. 112 As Judge Doyle pointed out in his dissent,' 1 3 investiga-
tions by Kerr-McGee and the AEC, expert testimony, and circumstantial
evidence were all essentially inconclusive and susceptible of reasonable di-
vergent inferences.'1 4 The question of whether Silkwood's injuries arose out
of and in the course of her employment therefore was a factual issue which
should have been submitted to the jury for resolution in accordance with
prior Oklahoma law.
Another weakness of the court's decision is the possibility that the
Silkwood jury awarded punitive damages based on a finding of intentional
conduct on the part of Kerr-McGee, thus rendering workers' compensation
inapplicable. Previous Oklahoma cases have held that where an employee is
intentionally or willfully injured by his employer, he may sue the employer
as if the workers' compensation law did not exist.' 15 The district court's
instruction in Silkwood that punitive damages could be awarded on the basis
of either actual malice or inferred malice allowed the jury to award punitive
damages on a finding of either intentional or reckless conduct." 16 If the jury
did base its award on a finding of intentional conduct, the workers' compen-
sation statute would not apply. Because of this possibility, the question of
reckless or intentional conduct on the part of Kerr-McGee should have been
remanded for a jury determination.
3. Legislative Intent
The holding that presumption of workers' compensation coverage is re-
ciprocal may confound legislative intent. In cases where there is no question
110. As Judge Doyle noted, not only was there "substantial evidence showing that contami-
nation occurred off the premises. . . . [but a] good deal of evidence was offered which was
designed to show that Kerr-McGee had a motive for intentionally exposing [Silkwood] to con-
tamination." 667 F.2d at 925 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
111. 667 F.2d at 919.
112. This issue was previously determined by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Flick v.
Crouch, 434 P.2d 256, 260-61 (Okla. 1967).
113. 667 F.2d at 923-25 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 925.
115. Ste, e.g., Hull v. Wolfe, 393 P.2d 491, 493 (Okla. 1964); Roberts v. Barclay, 369 P.2d
808, 809 (Okla. 1962).
116. 485 F. Supp. at 603 app.
302. [Vol. 60:2
1983] WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND FEDERAL PREEMPTION 303
whether an employee's injuries were job-related and no extenuating circum-
stances (e.g., intentional act of employer), it is consistent with the intent of
workers' compensation law to limit the employer's liability to the statutory
maximum. In cases such as Si/kwood, however, where there is a reasonable
doubt that the injuries were job-related, a court's denial of the plaintiff's
right to common law damages is inconsistent with the purpose of workers'
compensation laws. The overriding legislative intent of such laws is to pro-




The Tenth Circuit's disposition of the Si/kwood case creates new law on
the issue of federal preemption in the nuclear regulatory field. The court
determined that in this case the state law which allowed awards for property
damage did not constitute an unreasonable intrusion into the federal nuclear
regulatory scheme."' The opinion suggests that in determining awards for
property damages in the nuclear tort area, courts must consider the issue of
federal preemption on a case-by-case basis, even where the nuclear incident
is below the ENO level. Such a position seems contrary to the apparent
congressional intent to leave the liability determination to the states. By
requiring courts to decide on an ad hoc basis whether imposition of compen-
satory property damages conflicts with federal control, the state's authority
to develop its own tort law in this area is rendered virtually impotent.
2. Punitive Damages
The court determined that in all cases a punitive damages award
against a federally regulated nuclear facility constituted an unacceptable in-
trusion and thus was prohibited." 19 This interpretation imposes an unneces-
sary infringement on state decision-making for injuries below the ENO level.
More importantly, the holding carves out an unwarranted, indeed danger-
ous, exception to the preemption doctrine for the nuclear industry.
The court referred to an assumption implicit in the Price-Anderson Act
that only compensatory damages will be awarded in ENO cases. 120 The
court failed, however, to distinguish the Skwood situation, where one indi-
vidual was contaminated, from a catastrophic incident. The Price-Anderson
Act's implicit limitation in ENO cases represents a congressional intention to
provide the maximum recovery for the maximum number of people in the
event of a nuclear catastrophe. In a major nuclear accident, awarding puni-
tive damages to very few people could preclude others from any recovery
whatsoever. Awarding reasonable punitive damages to an individual plain-
tiff in an isolated case, however, would probably not prevent subsequent re-
117. Baldwin v. Big X Drilling Co., 322 P.2d 647, 649 (Okla. 1958). Set also Riesenfeld,
supra note 52, at 527 and accompanying text.
118. 667 F.2d at 920.
119. Id. at 923.
120. Id at 922. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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covery by other plaintiffs nor would it impede compliance with federal
regulations.
The court reasoned that imposition of punitive damages indirectly regu-
lates the industry and must be prohibited in deference to federal occupation
of the field.121 Such indirect regulation of the industry ostensibly sets a stan-
dard which conflicts with federal standards. Under such an assumption,
states that require proof of negligence for recovery in below-ENO-level cases
may be compelled to adopt the federal regulations as a standard of care in
order to avoid interfering with federal control. Only if the federal regula-
tions were violated, could the defendant be found to have breached the stan-
dard of care. This result is contrary to legislative intent. Congress explicitly
provided that states could adopt a strict liability standard for cases below the
ENO level. 122 No proof of negligence or violation of a federal regulation is
required for recovery under a strict liability standard. By allowing states to
adopt either a strict liability or a negligence standard, Congress presumably
intended that states would determine their own standards of care for noncat-
astrophic cases. State imposition of punitive damages should not be prohib-
ited because of a concern for the possible regulatory or standard-setting
effect of the damages. Indeed, Congress appears to have contemplated state
involvement in the area by allowing states to choose their own liability
standard.
The Tenth Circuit's preemption holding in Skwood does not follow log-
ically from the holdings in Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota 123 and Pacifx
Legal Foundation v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commis-
sion 124 In both Northern States and Pacifi Legal Foundation the federal appel-
late courts were examining state laws which directly regulated the nuclear
industry. In Northern States the Eighth Circuit found that the AEC's author-
ity to regulate construction and operation included authority to impose dis-
charge standards and thus preempted the state law.' 25 In Paific Legal
Foundation, however, the Ninth Circuit refused to find preemption where the
specific state laws at issue did not conflict with specific sections of the federal
statute.' 26 In Silkwood, the Tenth Circuit was not dealing with a specific
state statute and yet the court found preemption even though 1) tort law is
traditionally a state-occupied field, 12 7 2) there is a presumption of validity of
state law,' 2 8 and 3) punitive damages awards only speculatively regulate the
industry. 129
The court's willingness to abdicate the states' authority to punish the
nuclear tortfeasor to the AEC seems especially unjust in a case such as
Silkwood. Because no regulations were shown to have been violated, AEC
121. 667 F.2d at 922-23.
122. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
123. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), af dmem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
124. 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2959 (1982).
125. 447 F.2d at 1154.
126. 659 F.2d at 928.
127. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
128. Paific Legal Found , 659 F.2d at 919.
129. Such an award may not have the contemplated deterrent effect. In the absence of a
deterrent effect, there is no resulting regulation of the industry, and preemption is inapplicable.
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"punishment" was not forthcoming; yet an individual suffered irreparable
injuries and personal property was totally destroyed. Moreover, the court's
prohibition of punitive damages regardless of compliance or non-compliance
with AEC regulations" 0 may produce some unexpected results. Under such
a prohibition, even if a regulation were purposely and maliciously violated,
punitive damages would not be allowed. In the case of an obvious violation,
the AEC would intervene and impose sanctions. However, if no regulation
were shown to have been violated, yet the defendant's behavior was willful
and malicious, punitive damages would be unavailable. Such a result seems
contrary to well-established expectations of social policy.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's resolution of the workers' compensation issue
presented in Si/kwood may have far-reaching implications for future em-
ployee-litigants asserting common law claims against their employers. Un-
less the employee is able to produce evidence sufficient to rebut the
presumption that his injury was not job-related, his employer is likely to
escape all but statutory liability. Where only circumstantial evidence exists,
the employee will have difficulty sustaining the burden of proof; indeed, a
lack of direct evidence may preclude success in a common law action. Since
this result seems to recreate the rather oppressive aspects of the common law
scheme in which the plaintiffs recovery was inadequate and rare,""1 state
legislatures may want to restructure their current workers' compensation sys-
tems to ameliorate this effect. Such reform should entitle the plaintiff to a
jury determination of whether an injury was sustained in the course of
employment.
Implications of the court's preemption holding may likewise be far-
reaching. In an era of profound anti-nuclear sentiment and resistance to
federal interference in local concerns, one could expect the Si/kwood decision
to be a catalyst for congressional reaction. It is likely that states would wel-
come explicit congressional reassurance that nuclear accidents below the
ENO level are subject to state law. Indeed, the lack of that assurance may
be a disincentive to the nuclear industry to exercise greater care than the
minimum standards prescribed by federal regulations.
Cheryl Scott
130. 667 F.2d at 923.
131. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.

